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Article
According to theories in personality and social psychology, 
the motivation to see oneself positively is a powerful psy-
chological force (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, 
& Schimel, 2004; Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Vignoles, 
2011). The need for positive self-regard—or “self-esteem”—
has been shown to influence identity construction (Vignoles, 
Regalia, Manzi, Golledge, & Scabini, 2006), psychological 
and psychosocial adaptation (Orth, Robins, & Widaman, 
2012), and intergroup relations (Allen & Sherman, 2011). 
Hence, it is important to understand what leads people to see 
themselves more or less positively.
Several influential groups of researchers have argued 
recently for a culture-based view of self-esteem, whereby 
positive self-regard results from living up to values internal-
ized from one’s surrounding culture (Pyszczynski et al., 
2004; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003). This theoreti-
cal claim is intuitively appealing, and is central to recent 
arguments about the universality of self-esteem strivings 
(Sedikides et al., 2003). Yet, surprisingly, it has not been 
systematically tested until now.
We examined the potential roles of personal and normative 
value priorities (Schwartz, 1992, 2007) in moderating the 
dimensions on which people in different parts of the world 
evaluate themselves, using longitudinal, multilevel data from 
members of 20 cultural groups spanning Western and Eastern 
Europe, South America, Western and Eastern Asia, and Sub-
Saharan Africa. To foreshadow, our results showed that norma-
tive value priorities moderate the importance of different bases 
for self-evaluation, but these effects were largely independent 
of individuals’ personal endorsement of the same values.
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Abstract
Several theories propose that self-esteem, or positive self-regard, results from fulfilling the value priorities of one’s surrounding 
culture. Yet, surprisingly little evidence exists for this assertion, and theories differ about whether individuals must personally 
endorse the value priorities involved. We compared the influence of four bases for self-evaluation (controlling one’s life, 
doing one’s duty, benefitting others, achieving social status) among 4,852 adolescents across 20 cultural samples, using an 
implicit, within-person measurement technique to avoid cultural response biases. Cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses 
showed that participants generally derived feelings of self-esteem from all four bases, especially from those that were 
most consistent with the value priorities of others in their cultural context. Multilevel analyses confirmed that the bases of 
positive self-regard are sustained collectively: They are predictably moderated by culturally normative values but show little 
systematic variation with personally endorsed values.[AQ: 2]
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Self-Evaluation in Cultural Context
The view that bases of self-esteem vary across cultures has 
gained increasing currency over recent years. The self-con-
cept enhancing tactician model (SCENT; Sedikides & 
Strube, 1997) posits that people internalize culturally valued 
roles and evaluate themselves based on the extent to which 
they successfully enact these roles. Terror management the-
ory (TMT) defines self-esteem as “a sense of personal value 
that is obtained by believing (a) in the validity of one’s cul-
tural worldview and (b) that one is living up to the standards 
that are part of that worldview” (Pyszczynski et al., 2004, pp. 
436-437). Even critics of the self-enhancement literature 
seem to share a similar view: Notably, Heine (2005) pro-
posed that the “desire to be a good self,” defined as “striving 
to be the kind of person viewed as appropriate, good, and 
significant in one’s culture . . . can be described as univer-
sal,” even if the typical mechanisms by which people fulfill 
this striving vary greatly across cultures (p. 531).
Notwithstanding their differences,1 these perspectives 
converge to imply the existence of a universal long-term pro-
cess of self-evaluation, whereby over time individuals will 
come to derive positive self-regard from those aspects of 
their identities that are most consistent with the value priori-
ties of their surrounding culture. Yet, this crucial postulate of 
a culturally contextualized view of self-esteem has not been 
clearly substantiated.
In fact, early studies failed to support predictions that 
individual differences in self-esteem level would correlate 
more closely with independent self-construal among North 
American participants and with interdependent self-construal 
among East Asian participants (e.g., Singelis, Bond, Sharkey, 
& Lai, 1999). Later studies showed that members of different 
cultural groups tended to rate themselves more positively 
than others especially on value dimensions that were cultur-
ally relevant, when asked to evaluate themselves (e.g., 
Brown & Kobayashi, 2002; Sedikides et al., 2003); however, 
the researchers did not test whether they actually derived 
feelings of self-esteem from doing so (Heine & Hamamura, 
2007).
Three recent articles have begun to provide firmer evi-
dence: Among students from eight cultural groups, Goodwin 
et al. (2012) found that self-esteem was correlated with “self-
perceived mate-value characteristics” (e.g., caring, sociabil-
ity, passion), but there were some interpretable group 
differences regarding which characteristics were most 
strongly linked to self-esteem. Analyzing data from online 
daters in 11 European nations, Gebauer, Wagner, Sedikides, 
and Neberich (2013) found that self-esteem was correlated 
more strongly with self-perceived agency in those countries 
where people on average rated themselves as more agentic, 
and with self-perceived communion in those countries where 
people on average rated themselves as higher in communion. 
Cai et al. (2011) found experimental evidence that Chinese 
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(but not American) participants derived implicit self-
esteem from portraying themselves in a modest light, sup-
porting a causal role of modesty as a source of self-esteem in 
Chinese culture. However, they focused on just one value 
dimension, modesty, and their experiment provided evidence 
for short-term processes only. Crucially, none of these 
researchers directly measured their participants’ personal or 
cultural value priorities.
Is Personal Endorsement of Cultural 
Values Necessary?
According to both the SCENT model and TMT, individuals 
are motivated to embody values that they have internalized 
from their cultural environment. Starting in infancy, people 
internalize ideas of good and bad from their parents, peers, 
and wider society; an individual feels valuable when she ful-
fills what she has internalized as good—her personalized 
version of the cultural worldview (Greenberg & Arndt, 
2012). Hence, bases of self-esteem should vary as an indirect 
function of normative value priorities—but most proximally 
as a function of personal value priorities. Thus, it is often 
thought that values must be personally endorsed to have an 
impact on self-evaluation. However, theoretical arguments 
and suggestive evidence against this view can also be found.
Sociometer theory (Leary, 2005) posits that self-evalua-
tion processes are actually expressions of a more fundamen-
tal human need to belong: People seek to increase their 
social value and acceptance, and self-esteem is a person’s 
implicit assessment of how well he or she is doing in this 
respect—a monitor of relational value in the eyes of others. 
Leary (2005) suggested that the criteria for being relation-
ally valued—and thus the bases on which people might 
establish feelings of self-esteem—vary across cultures. 
However, self-evaluation is thought to be based on percep-
tions of what will make others accept (or reject) one, rather 
than on one’s own values. Hence, individuals would still 
base their self-esteem on value dimensions that are priori-
tized in their cultural environment, but these values would 
not need to be personally endorsed—instead, bases of self-
esteem should vary as a direct function of culturally norma-
tive values, regardless of personal endorsement.
Findings from single-culture studies have also questioned 
the importance of personal values in moderating the bases of 
global self-esteem (Marsh, 2008). Following James’s (1890) 
original theorizing about self-esteem, researchers have tested 
the role of individuals’ ratings of domain importance (i.e., 
values) in moderating relationships between domain-specific 
self-evaluations and global self-esteem (e.g., Hardy & 
Moriarty, 2006; Marsh, 1995, 2008; Pelham, 1995). Analyses 
have typically shown that global self-esteem is tied more 
strongly to self-evaluations in domains that are normatively 
regarded as important; however, weighting the domains by 
individual differences in importance adds little or no vari-
ance to predictions of global self-esteem. Although there is 
some debate about how to interpret these findings (see Hardy 
& Leone, 2008; Marsh, 2008), they suggest that bases of 
self-esteem are not necessarily tied to individuals’ personal 
value priorities.
Cross-cultural studies of self-enhancement have yet to 
untangle the respective roles of personal and normative value 
priorities in explaining the differences observed. Studies 
have either (a) not tested their assumptions about which 
value dimensions are most important for different cultural 
samples (e.g., Heine & Lehman, 1995), (b) validated the rel-
evance of values at the group level (e.g., Kobayashi & 
Brown, 2003), or (c) measured the importance of attributes 
individually to examine within-participant correlations 
between the personal importance of the attributes and the 
extent of self-enhancement on each attribute (e.g., Tam et al., 
2012). Only this last category of studies directly considers 
participants’ personal value priorities, but these studies have 
still not distinguished personal from group-level importance 
(see Marsh, 1995). Moreover, expected effects were not 
found in all cultural groups or on all types of measures.
Thus, despite its prevalence within the literature, the view 
that bases of self-esteem depend on values that individuals 
have personally adopted from their cultural surroundings has 
not yet been effectively tested. An adequate test of this theo-
retical proposition requires distinguishing the effects of per-
sonally endorsing a particular cultural orientation from the 
effects of living in a particular cultural context. A multilevel 
approach—modeling individual-level and cultural-level 
effects simultaneously across many cultural groups—is 
needed to establish whether it is the “climate” of values that 
prevails in a given context or a cultural member’s personal 
endorsement of those values that matters more directly (see 
Becker et al., 2012).
Cultural and Individual Values: 
Implications for Self-Esteem
Previous cross-cultural studies of self-processes have often 
predicted (or assumed) participants’ value priorities based on 
conventional thinking about East–West differences in cul-
tural individualism–collectivism. However, focusing on a 
single bipolar contrast provides a limited portrayal of cul-
tural differences. We wanted to base our predictions on a 
broader, theoretically based approach to representing cul-
tural variation in value priorities. Hence, we grounded our 
predictions in Schwartz’s (1992, 2007) values theory, which 
has been extensively validated across cultures. We now 
introduce this model and describe the specific predictions we 
generated regarding individual and cross-cultural variation 
in bases for self-evaluation.
Schwartz (1992) examined 10 value types that vary in 
their compatibility or incompatibility with each other. He 
found that individual differences in value priorities are orga-
nized in a circumplex structure, which can be represented 
using two bipolar dimensions: openness to change versus 
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conservation and self-transcendence versus self-enhance-
ment (see Figure 1). This structure has now been identified in 
more than 75 nations, and several studies have found a 
broadly similar, but not identical, two-dimensional structure 
in culture-level analyses (e.g., Fischer, 2012; Fischer, 
Vauclair, Fontaine, & Schwartz, 2010; Schwartz, 2009).2 The 
distinction between openness and conservation contrasts val-
ues of self-direction and stimulation—which tend to be 
higher in individualistic cultures—with those of tradition, 
security, and conformity—which tend to be higher in collec-
tivistic cultures (Gheorghiu, Vignoles, & Smith, 2009; Owe 
et al., 2013). The distinction between self-transcendence and 
self-enhancement contrasts values of universalism and 
benevolence with those of achievement and power.
Although self-esteem may be based on numerous factors 
(e.g., physical attractiveness, competence at work, positive 
relationships), we decided to focus on a subset of possible 
bases for self-evaluation that we expected to be differentially 
linked with these two dimensions of values. Thus, our theo-
rizing led us to focus on four potential sources of self-esteem: 
controlling one’s life, doing one’s duty, benefitting others, 
and achieving social status. Below we describe how we 
linked these constructs to the dimensions of Schwartz’s 
(1992) values model (see Figure 1).
Underlying the dimension of openness versus conserva-
tion is a motivational conflict between self-directedness and 
freedom on one hand, and preserving the social order through 
obedience and conformity on the other. To be self-directed 
and free means controlling one’s own life, but too much 
focus on individual control and freedom may be detrimental 
to social stability and cohesion. In contrast, preserving the 
social order involves doing one’s duty, but focusing too 
much on obedience to others is incompatible with self-
directedness. This motivational conflict between controlling 
one’s own life and doing one’s duty features in theoretical 
descriptions of individualism–collectivism (e.g., Hofstede, 
1980; Triandis, 1995). However, these constructs have not 
previously been studied as alternative bases for self-evalua-
tion across cultures.
We formulated parallel hypotheses to test the role of personal 
and normative value priorities. Thus, we predicted that individ-
uals who prioritize openness over conservation (or members of 
cultures where people on average prioritize openness over con-
servation) would base their self-esteem to a greater extent on 
controlling one’s life, whereas this would be a weaker basis for 
self-evaluation among individuals who (or members of cultures 
that) prioritize conservation over openness; the latter, in con-
trast, would base their self-esteem to a greater extent on doing 
Figure 1. Relations among the 10 value types of Schwartz’s model of human values.
Source. Adapted from Schwartz (1992).
Note. The two bipolar value dimensions used in the present study, as well as their four corresponding bases of self-esteem that we hypothesized, are 
indicated in the boxes.
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their duty, whereas this would be a weaker basis for self-
evaluation among individuals who (or members of cultures 
that) prioritize openness over conservation.
Underlying the dimension of individual-level self- 
transcendence versus self-enhancement is a motivational con-
flict between prioritizing others’ welfare and prioritizing one’s 
own interests. Thus, concern for others’ welfare is a key distin-
guishing feature of this second dimension. We theorized that 
individuals who (or members of cultures that) prioritize self-
transcendence over self-enhancement would base their self-
esteem especially on the extent to which they saw themselves as 
benefitting others; this would be a weaker basis for self-evalua-
tion among those who (or members of cultures that) prioritize 
self-enhancement over self-transcendence. Values of power and 
achievement emphasized in self-enhancement suggest viewing 
others in instrumental terms or as social comparison targets. 
Hence, we theorized that individuals who (or members of cul-
tures that) prioritize self-enhancement over self-transcendence 
would base their self-esteem to a greater extent on achieving 
social status, whereas this would be a weaker basis for self-
evaluation among individuals who (or members of cultures that) 
prioritize self-transcendence over self-enhancement.
Summary of Aims and Hypotheses
We aimed to conduct the most systematic test to date of a 
culturally contextualized model of self-esteem—the first 
study to examine whether bases for self-evaluation vary 
predictably with cultural and individual differences in value 
priorities, using Schwartz’s (1992) model to provide an 
adequate characterization of value priorities, and recruiting 
participants from a larger and more diverse range of cul-
tural groups than previous studies. As described above, 
self-esteem may be based on any number of factors, but we 
focused here on four potential bases—controlling one’s life, 
doing one’s duty, benefitting others, and achieving social 
status—chosen for their specific relevance to the dimen-
sions of Schwartz’s values model.
We modeled self-evaluation as an intrapersonal process 
that might be moderated by individual and/or cultural dif-
ferences in value priorities. Thus, we used a within-person 
methodology to measure the strength of each hypothesized 
basis for self-evaluation (illustrated in Figure 2). Each par-
ticipant listed freely several aspects of his or her identity 
(e.g., “woman,” “musician,” “ambitious”), then rated each 
identity aspect (a) for its association with feelings of self-
esteem and (b) for its association with each of the four 
bases for self-evaluation—for example, how much it 
increased his or her social status. The latter ratings were 
used to predict within-person variation in the former rat-
ings. Thus, rather than ask people directly what they based 
their self-esteem on (cf. Crocker & Wolfe, 2001), we mea-
sured their bases for self-evaluation indirectly through sta-
tistical patterns in their data.
This technique has several notable advantages. By focus-
ing on within-person variance, the results are insulated from 
several common sources of methodological bias in cross-
cultural research, including the reference-group effect 
(Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002) and acquiescent 
response styles (Smith, 2004). Our approach also avoids the 
need for participants to report directly on their levels of per-
sonal self-esteem, which may be subject to culturally vari-
able self-presentational influences. For example, when 
research participants in China report relatively critical self-
views, this may be to conform with social norms of modesty 
(Cai et al., 2011). Hence, it is preferable to study cultural 
differences in self-evaluation using more indirect techniques 
(Kobayashi & Greenwald, 2003; Yamaguchi et al., 2007).
Moreover, for the first time in cross-cultural research into 
the bases of self-esteem, we used a longitudinal methodol-
ogy to examine the ongoing, long-term process of self-eval-
uation. Participants rerated their identity aspects for 
associations with self-esteem around 5 months later, allow-
ing us to model our predicted effects both contemporane-
ously and over a time-lag of several months. Thus, we could 
test directly the temporal precedence of the four bases as pro-
spective predictors of the long-term process by which par-
ticipants reevaluated their identity aspects over time.
Crucially, our study was designed to test whether personal 
and/or normative value priorities would moderate the degree 
to which individuals based their self-esteem on controlling 
their life, doing their duty, benefitting others, or achieving 
social status. Using multilevel analyses, we were able to 
evaluate to what extent it is personal endorsement of value 
priorities (i.e., personal values) or living in a specific cultural 
climate (i.e., normative values) that matters more. As 
described above, conflicting theoretical claims have been 
made regarding whether one or the other should exert the 
most proximal influence on bases of self-esteem. Thus, 
across cultures, we expected that the strength of these bases 
for self-evaluation would vary depending on personal and/or 
normative value priorities, and we tested in parallel for mod-
eration effects at both levels of analysis:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): On average, participants would 
derive self-esteem from aspects of their identity that gave 
them a sense of controlling their life (Hypothesis 1a 
[H1a]). This tendency would be stronger among individu-
als personally prioritizing openness (vs. conservation) 
values (Hypothesis 1b [H1b]) and/or members of cultural 
groups normatively prioritizing openness (vs. conserva-
tion) values (Hypothesis 1c [H1c]).
Hypothesis 2 (H2): On average, participants would 
derive self-esteem from aspects of their identity that 
involved doing their duty (Hypothesis 2a [H2a]). This 
tendency would be stronger among individuals personally 
prioritizing conservation (vs. openness) values 
(Hypothesis 2b [H2b]) and/or members of cultural groups 
6 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 
normatively prioritizing conservation (vs. openness) val-
ues (Hypothesis 2c [H2c]).
Hypothesis 3 (H3): On average, participants would 
derive self-esteem from aspects of their identity that they 
saw as benefitting others (Hypothesis 3a [H3a]). This ten-
dency would be stronger among individuals personally 
prioritizing self-transcendence (vs. self-enhancement) 
values (Hypothesis 3b [H3b]) and/or members of cultural 
groups normatively prioritizing self-transcendence (vs. 
self-enhancement) values (Hypothesis 3c [H3c]).
Hypothesis 4 (H4): On average, participants would 
derive self-esteem from aspects of their identity that con-
tributed to them achieving social status (Hypothesis 4a 
[H4a]). This tendency would be stronger among individu-
als personally prioritizing self-enhancement (vs. 
self-transcendence) values (Hypothesis 4b [H4b]) and/or 
members of cultural groups normatively prioritizing self-
enhancement (vs. self-transcendence) values (Hypothesis 
4c [H4c]).
Method
Participants and Procedure
Participants were 5,254 late adolescents in 20 cultural 
groups, of whom 4,852 (92%) were included in our analyses. 
Ninety-six (2%) were excluded because they had lived less 
than 10 years in the country or were aged 25 or above; 306 
(6%) were excluded because of missing data. All were stu-
dents in high schools or equivalent, except in the Philippines, 
Figure 2. Illustrative examples of identity aspects and their ratings from one British and one Filipino participant in our study.
Note. Here, Participant A (left) shows a positive correlation between the extent to which an aspect of identity makes her feel in control of her life (top) 
and the feeling of self-esteem provided by that aspect. A negative correlation appears between the extent to which her identity aspects involve doing 
her duty toward others (bottom) and the feeling of self-esteem. This indicates that the self-esteem of Participant A is based more on controlling her life, 
and not on doing her duty. Participant B (right) shows a very different profile and seems to base her self-esteem more on doing her duty, and less on 
controlling her life.
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where we sampled students in tertiary education (at technical 
colleges and universities) to match the ages of participants 
from other nations. Most samples were recruited from mainly 
urban areas. Participants in most samples typically rated 
their families as of approximately average wealth. Further 
descriptive data can be found in Table 1.
Most cultural samples were from different nations. 
However, samples from five Brazilian regions were initially 
included. Based on preliminary analyses, we distinguished 
two cultural profiles within the Brazilian data: A more open 
and self-transcendent profile was found among participants 
from Coastal and Amazonian regions, whereas participants 
from Central Brazil showed a somewhat greater emphasis on 
conservation and self-enhancement values (see Figure 3). 
Hence, we created two Brazilian cultural groupings for use 
in subsequent analyses.
Participants were recruited voluntarily at their schools 
and were not compensated. They were told that the question-
naire formed part of a university project on beliefs, thoughts, 
and feelings; however, they remained uninformed about the 
specific purpose of the research and about its cross-cultural 
character.
Around 5 months later (ranging from 3 to 8 months), par-
ticipants in 17 cultural groups (see Table 1) were given 
personalized follow-up questionnaires; 3,519 participants 
completed the second questionnaire, representing 33% total 
attrition (median attrition rate 26% in those samples that 
were recontacted). Attrition analyses in each sample revealed 
only minor demographic differences between those who did 
or did not complete Time 2 (T2), and no differences on any 
of our substantive measures. At T2, 55 (<2%) participants 
were excluded from analyses because they had reported hav-
ing lived less than 10 years in the country or being aged 25 or 
more; 286 (8%) were excluded because of missing data. 
Thus, at T2, 3,178 participants were included in our 
analyses.
Time 1 (T1) Questionnaire
Measures were included in a larger questionnaire concerning 
identity construction and cultural orientation (Becker et al., 
2012; Owe et al., 2013; Vignoles & Brown, 2011). The ques-
tionnaire was translated from English into the main language 
of each country (see Table 1). Independent back-translations 
were made by bilinguals unfamiliar with the research topic 
and hypotheses. Ambiguities and inconsistencies were iden-
tified and resolved by discussion, and the translations 
adjusted.
Table 1. Descriptives of Each Cultural Sample.
Sample n (T1) n (T2)
Female 
(%) M age
Village/
rural 
(%)
Mean 
socioeconomic 
statusa
Normative 
openness to 
change (vs. 
conservation)
Normative self-
transcendence 
(vs. self-
enhancement)
GNI per 
capita
Questionnaire 
language
Belgium 246 205 68 17.33 19 4.05 1.20 1.22 41,110 French
Coastal and Amazonian Brazil 
(Belem, Rio de Janeiro, João 
Pessoa, Porto Alegre)
610 451 63 16.78 1 3.88 1.23 1.02 5,860 Portuguese
Central Brazil (Goiânia) 123 93 49 14.85 3 3.65 .68 .40 5,860 Portuguese
Chile 394 340 47 16.21 1 4.65 .97 1.26 8,190 Spanish
China 227 — 48 15.88 0 3.58 .46 .60 2,370 Chinese
Colombia 203 123 43 15.84 11 4.40 1.27 .45 4,100 Spanish
Estonia 234 189 59 16.86 31 4.35 1.23 .85 12,830 Estonian
Ethiopia 249 236 45 17.57 0 3.62 .17 .47 220 Amharic
Georgia 246 174 58 16.11 2 4.27 .67 .92 2,120 Georgian
Hungary 238 177 52 16.49 15 4.45 1.23 .35 11,680 Hungarian
Italy 318 182 52 17.75 89 4.24 .49 .85 33,490 Italian
Lebanon 295 208 46 17.07 2 4.55 .67 .34 5,800 Arabic
Namibia 96 — 64 17.30 4 3.45 .14 1.09 3,450 English
Oman 248 178 49 16.51 13 4.83 .07 .62 12,860 Arabic
Philippines 296 217 66 17.38 16 4.23 .14 .59 1,620 English
Poland 249 122 57 17.24 5 4.54 .98 .37 9,850 Polish
Romania 220 179 49 17.08 14 4.79 .74 .37 6,390 Romanian
Spain 223 175 53 16.44 36 4.59 1.19 1.22 29,290 Spanish
Turkey 197 — 50 16.52 2 4.10 .19 .85 8,030 Turkish
United Kingdom 246 215 76 16.66 20 4.20 1.24 .69 40,660 English
Total 5,158 3,464  
Note. Descriptives are for all participants who met our inclusion criteria at Time 1. Sample sizes in our analyses differ slightly because of missing data. GNI = gross national income 
in USD.
aMean scores of answers to the question: “Compared to other people in [nation], how would you describe your family’s level of financial wealth?”; response scale ranging from 
1 = very poor to 7 = very rich.
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Within-person measurement of the self-evaluation process. First, 
participants were asked to generate freely 10 answers to the 
question “Who are you?” (hereafter, identity aspects), using 
an adapted version of the Twenty Statements Test (TST; 
Kuhn & McPartland, 1954). This task was at the beginning, 
so that responses would be constrained as little as possible by 
theoretical expectations or demand characteristics. It was 
printed on a page that folded out to the side of the question-
naire, so that participants could see their identity aspects 
when rating them subsequently.
The TST has sometimes been criticized for priming an 
individualized, decontextualized, introspective “self,” argu-
ably closer to Western than to other cultural conceptions of 
selfhood (see Smith, Fischer, Vignoles, & Bond, 2013). 
Based on discussions with our international collaborators, 
we produced a culturally de-centered version of this task, 
rewording the original question “Who am I?” into “Who are 
you?” and developing a revised set of instructions (reported 
in Becker et al., 2012). Common answers included individ-
ual characteristics (e.g., “intelligent,” “shy”), social roles and 
interpersonal relationships (e.g., “friend,” “pupil”), and 
social categories (e.g., “girl,” “Hungarian”).
Participants subsequently rated each of their identity 
aspects on various dimensions. Each dimension was pre-
sented as a question at the top of a new page, with a block of 
11-point scales (0 = not at all; 10 = extremely) positioned 
underneath to line up with the identity aspects. One question 
measured the association of each identity aspect with feel-
ings of self-esteem (“How much does each of these things 
make you see yourself positively?”).
Later on, we included items reflecting the four hypothe-
sized bases of self-esteem: controlling one’s life (“How much 
does each of these things make you feel that you are in con-
trol of your own life?’), doing one’s duty (“How much does 
each of these things involve doing your duty toward oth-
ers?’), benefitting others (“How much do you feel that other 
people benefit from you being each of these things?’), and 
achieving social status (“How much does each of these things 
increase your social status?’). To avoid carryover effects, 
these four items were separated from the self-esteem item by 
several pages of intervening measures and were interspersed 
among many other rating questions, related to other identity 
motives (e.g., distinctiveness and continuity).
Personal and normative value priorities. Participants also com-
pleted the short-form Portrait Values Questionnaire 
(Schwartz, 2007). Participants read 21 vignettes describing a 
person of their gender portraying different value priorities, 
and indicated how similar each was to themselves. The 
6-point scale ranges from 1 (very much like me) to 6 (not like 
me at all); however, we reverse coded all items so that higher 
scores would reflect greater endorsement of each value por-
trayed. As recommended by Schwartz, we then ipsatized the 
responses by centering each participant’s item ratings around 
Figure 3. Scores for 20 cultural groups on normative openness (vs. conservation) and normative self-transcendence (vs. self-
enhancement) values.
Note. Lines around each point illustrate 95% confidence intervals.
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his or her mean across all items, to eliminate individual dif-
ferences in response style.
We used the ipsatized ratings to create individual-level 
scores for two bipolar value dimensions. The first was per-
sonal openness versus conservation values (12 items: overall 
α = .69, median α = .67). Sample items are as follows: “He/
she looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He/she wants 
to have an exciting life,” and “It is important to him/her to 
always behave properly. He/she wants to avoid doing any-
thing people would say is wrong” (reversed). We then calcu-
lated cultural group means of these scores to measure 
normative openness versus conservation values (α = .84). 
Consistent with viewing this dimension as related to individ-
ualism–collectivism, normative openness versus conserva-
tion values correlated negatively with House, Hanges, 
Javidan, Dorfman, and Gupta (2004) national scores of 
ingroup collectivism practices (r = −.51), and correlated as 
expected with Schwartz’s (2009) culture-level scores for 
autonomy (affective: r = .71; intellectual: r = .55) versus 
embeddedness (r = −.68) values.3
The second individual-level dimension was personal self-
transcendence versus self-enhancement values (nine items: 
overall α = .63, median α = .63). Sample items for this dimen-
sion were as follows: “He/she thinks it is important that every 
person in the world should be treated equally. He/she believes 
everyone should have equal opportunities in life,” and “Being 
very successful is important to him/her. He/she hopes people 
will recognize his/her achievements” (reversed). Again, we 
computed cultural group means for these individual scores to 
estimate normative self-transcendence versus self-enhance-
ment values (α = .69). As expected, culture-level scores on 
this dimension were uncorrelated with House and collabora-
tors’ (2004) national scores of ingroup collectivism practices 
(r = .02). However, these scores correlated as expected with 
Schwartz’s (2009) culture-level scores for egalitarianism (r = 
.69); correlations with harmony (r = .40), mastery (r = −.17), 
and hierarchy (r = −.28) were in the expected directions, 
although not significant.3
Figure 3 depicts the positions of each cultural group on 
the two normative value dimensions. The general tendency 
across groups to prioritize openness over conservation and 
self-transcendence over self-enhancement is consistent with 
previous research showing a pan-cultural tendency to rate 
benevolence and universalism (comprising self-transcen-
dence) and self-direction (contributing to openness) as the 
three most important values, and that younger people tend to 
value self-direction even more strongly than adult samples 
(Schwartz & Bardi, 2001).
Demographic information. Participants indicated their gender, 
date of birth, nationality, country of birth, and several other 
demographic characteristics. To control for national differ-
ences in economic development, we included data on gross 
national income (GNI) per capita, retrieved from the World 
Bank (2010) report.
T2 Questionnaire
Participants’ identity aspects from the T1 questionnaire were 
copied and attached to the T2 questionnaire. Thus, every par-
ticipant received a personalized T2 questionnaire. First, par-
ticipants were asked to indicate whether their responses were 
still true, needed revising, or were no longer true in any way; 
they were asked to replace any responses that were no longer 
true and to update any that needed revising. Of 34,034 initial 
identity aspects, 846 (2.5%) were marked as no longer true, 
and were therefore excluded from analyses (this led to the 
exclusion of one participant, who had replaced all of her 
identity aspects). Updated responses (n = 2,069, 7.0%) were 
retained in our analyses, because participants still regarded 
them as adequate descriptions of who they were (e.g., they 
might add precision, by revising “can be shy in groups” into 
“can be shy in new groups”). Participants rated their identity 
aspects for self-esteem using the same item used at T1.
Analytical Approach
Given the nested data structure, we tested predictions of 
within-person variance in feelings of self-esteem using mul-
tilevel regression analysis (Hox, 2002). Level 1 units were 
identity aspects (n T1 = 46,332; n T2 = 29,061), with indi-
viduals as Level 2 units (n T1 = 4,852; n T2 = 3,178), and 
cultures as Level 3 units (n T1 = 20; n T2 = 17). At Level 1, 
regression coefficients were modeled for within-person pre-
dictors of the self-esteem ratings (controlling one’s life, 
doing one’s duty, benefitting others, achieving social status). 
These predictors were centered around participant means, so 
that the within-person effects we were interested in were not 
confounded with between-person covariance (Hofmann & 
Gavin, 1998). At Level 2, regression coefficients were mod-
eled for individual difference variables (personal value pri-
orities and gender). Gender was included to control for 
differences in the gender composition of our samples, but we 
had no theoretical basis for predicting gender differences. At 
Level 3, regression coefficients were modeled for culture-
level variables (normative value priorities and GNI). 
Continuous variables at Levels 2 and 3 were centered around 
their grand means, and a contrast code was used for gender 
(female = −1, male = 1). We used grand mean centering 
rather than group-mean centering at Level 2 to control for the 
potential confounding influence of aggregated individual-
level moderations when testing culture-level moderations at 
Level 3 (Firebaugh, 1980; Hofmann & Gavin, 1998). 
Analyses were conducted in HLM 6 (Raudenbush, Bryk, & 
Congdon, 2007), using full maximum likelihood estimation 
with convergence criterion of .000001.
Results
We conducted two parallel sets of analyses: Cross-sectional 
analyses predicted T1 self-esteem ratings, and longitudinal 
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analyses predicted T2 self-esteem ratings while controlling 
for T1 self-esteem ratings.
Cross-Sectional Models
We computed a series of multilevel regression models pre-
dicting T1 self-esteem ratings using the four hypothesized 
sources of self-esteem: controlling one’s life, doing one’s 
duty, benefitting others, and achieving social status. 
Parameters are shown in Table 2. Model 1 included just these 
four ratings as Level 1 predictors. Supporting H1a to H4a, all 
four sources of self-esteem were significant predictors of the 
self-esteem ratings (Bs from .14-.25), indicating that, on 
average, participants tended to derive greater feelings of self-
esteem from those of their identity aspects that they associ-
ated with controlling their lives, doing their duty, benefitting 
others, and achieving social status. This model accounted for 
an estimated 44.63% of within-person variance in 
self-esteem.
We then added cross-level interaction effects to see 
whether the weight of self-esteem on each of the four bases 
was significantly moderated by personal and/or normative 
values. Thus, we entered scores of personal openness (vs. 
conservation) and personal self-transcendence (vs. self-
enhancement) as Level 2 moderators, and normative open-
ness (vs. conservation) and normative self-transcendence 
(vs. self-enhancement) as Level 3 moderators, of the Level 1 
regression weights on the four bases of self-esteem (Model 
2). Following Aiken and West (1991), we included the under-
lying main effects alongside these theoretically important 
interaction effects. Compared with Model 1, this model pro-
vided a significant improvement in fit, χ2(20) = 232.39, p < 
.001.
Crucially, significant cross-level interaction effects 
involving normative value priorities (H1c-H4c) showed a 
pattern supporting our predictions (Table 2): Controlling 
one’s life was a stronger predictor of self-esteem in cultures 
where people on average endorsed more openness values 
(H1c: B = .09, p < .001), whereas doing one’s duty was a 
stronger predictor in cultures where people endorsed more 
conservation values (H2c: B = −.08, p < .001). Unexpectedly, 
doing one’s duty was also more important in cultures where 
people endorsed more self-transcendence values (B = .05, p 
= .001). As predicted, benefitting others was more important 
in cultures where people endorsed more self-transcendence 
values (H3c: B = .07, p < .001), whereas achieving social 
status was more important in cultures where people endorsed 
more self-enhancement values (H4c: B = −.06, p = .001).
As discussed by McClelland and Judd (1993), it is notori-
ously difficult to detect moderation effects in correlational 
studies, and even substantively important interactions may 
account for seemingly trivial amounts of variance. To help 
readers evaluate the substantive importance of the effects 
that we found, we have estimated the magnitude of the Level 
1 effects at upper- and lower-bound values of each value 
dimension. We estimated simple slopes for the regression of 
self-esteem on each of the four bases at minimum (0.07) and 
maximum (1.27) values of normative openness (vs. conser-
vation), and at minimum (0.34) and maximum (1.26) values 
of normative self-transcendence (vs. self-enhancement). As 
shown in Figure 4, the effect of controlling one’s life was 
considerably stronger in cultures with the most open values 
(B = .27, p < .001), compared with those where conservation 
values were most prevalent (B = .17, p < .001). In contrast, 
the effect of doing one’s duty was considerably weaker in 
cultures with the most open values (B = .10, p < .001), com-
pared with those where conservation values were most prev-
alent (B = .20, p < .001). Effects of benefitting others and of 
doing one’s duty were considerably stronger in cultures with 
the most self-transcendent values (B = .28, p < .001 and B = 
.17, p < .001, respectively), compared with those with the 
most self-enhancing values (B = .21, p < .001 and B = .12, p 
< .001, respectively). The effect of achieving social status 
was somewhat weaker in cultures with the most self-tran-
scendent values (B = .21, p < .001), than in those with the 
most self-enhancing values (B = .27, p < .001).
Individual-level moderations also appeared (Table 2), but 
these were smaller in magnitude, and the overall pattern was 
not consistent with H1b to H4b. Contrary to H1b, the effect 
of controlling one’s life was slightly stronger among partici-
pants endorsing more conservation values (B = −.01, p = 
.003),4 and also among participants with more self-transcen-
dence values (B = .02, p < .001). Supporting H4b, the effect 
of achieving social status was slightly stronger among par-
ticipants with more self-enhancement values (B = −.01, p < 
.001). We estimated the simple slopes of bases of self-esteem 
at extreme values (2 SD below and above the mean) of per-
sonal openness (vs. conservation; −1.70, 3.30) and personal 
self-transcendence (vs. self-enhancement; −1.76, 3.28). As 
shown in Figure 5, the effect of achieving social status was 
somewhat stronger among participants with more self-
enhancement values (B = .28, p < .001), compared with those 
with more self-transcendence values (B = .21, p < .001).
Overall, the results of our cross-sectional analyses were 
consistent with H1c to H4c (positing effects of living in a 
particular cultural environment). Among H1b to H4b (posit-
ing effects of holding particular value priorities oneself), 
only H4b was supported.5
Longitudinal Models
To provide a prospective test of our predictions, we com-
puted a parallel series of models predicting T2 self-esteem 
ratings, while controlling for T1 self-esteem ratings. We 
allowed the effect of T1 self-esteem to vary randomly at both 
Levels 2 and 3, to account for individual- and group-level 
variation in the stability of self-esteem ratings over time. 
Model parameters are shown in Table 3. First, we included 
just the four bases of self-esteem along with T1 self-esteem 
as Level 1 predictors (Model 3).
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Table 2. Estimated Parameters of Multilevel Regression Predicting Self-Esteem Ratings at Time 1.
Model 1 Model 2
 B SE p B SE p
Within-participants main effects (Level 1: n = 46,332 identity aspects)
 Controlling one’s life (Hypothesis 1a) .234 .005 <.001 .226 .005 <.001
 Doing one’s duty (Hypothesis 2a) .141 .004 <.001 .145 .005 <.001
 Benefitting others (Hypothesis 3a) .248 .004 <.001 .243 .005 <.001
 Achieving social status (Hypothesis 4a) .244 .005 <.001 .244 .005 <.001
Individual-level main effects (Level 2: n = 4,852 individuals)
 Personal openness (vs. conservation) .041 .018 .026
 Personal self-transcendence (vs. self-enhancement) .066 .018 <.001
Culture-level main effects (Level 3: n = 20 cultural groups)
 Normative openness (vs. conservation) −.598 .174 .003
 Normative self-transcendence (vs. self-
enhancement)
−.217 .241 .381
Individual-level moderators of within-participants slopes
 Personal openness (vs. conservation) × Controlling 
one’s life (Hypothesis 1b)
−.011 .004 .003
 Personal openness (vs. conservation) × Doing one’s 
duty (Hypothesis 2b)
.001 .004 .813
 Personal openness (vs. conservation) × Benefitting 
others
.003 .003 .435
 Personal openness (vs. conservation) × Achieving 
social status
.004 .004 .312
 Personal self-transcendence (vs. self-enhancement) 
× Controlling one’s life
.019 .004 <.001
 Personal self-transcendence (vs. self-enhancement) 
× Doing one’s duty
.001 .003 .661
 Personal self-transcendence (vs. self-enhancement) 
× Benefitting others (Hypothesis 3b)
−.003 .003 .357
 Personal self-transcendence (vs. self-enhancement) 
× Achieving social status (Hypothesis 4b)
−.015 .004 <.001
Culture-level moderators of within-participants slopes
 Normative openness (vs. conservation) × 
Controlling one’s life (Hypothesis 1c)
.088 .012 <.001
 Normative openness (vs. conservation) × Doing 
one’s duty (Hypothesis 2c)
−.082 .012 <.001
 Normative openness (vs. conservation) × 
Benefitting others
−.008 .012 .468
 Normative openness (vs. conservation) × Achieving 
social status
.021 .013 .094
 Normative self-transcendence (vs. self-
enhancement) × Controlling one’s life
.004 .016 .807
 Normative self-transcendence (vs. self-
enhancement) × Doing one’s duty
.053 .015 .001
 Normative self-transcendence (vs. self-
enhancement) × Benefitting others (Hypothesis 3c)
.075 .015 <.001
 Normative self-transcendence (vs. self-
enhancement) × Achieving social status 
(Hypothesis 4c)
−.060 .016 .001
Residual variance
 Within-participant level (σ2) 3.75 3.73  
 Individual level (τ
π
) 1.86 <.001 1.86 <.001
 Culture level (τ
β
) .16 <.001 .10 <.001
Deviance 201,256 201,023
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Across the sample as a whole, all four bases of self-esteem 
were significant prospective predictors of the T2 self-esteem 
ratings (Bs from .04-.10). This supports H1a to H4a, provid-
ing evidence that doing one’s duty, controlling one’s life, 
benefitting others, and achieving social status are temporal 
antecedents of feelings of self-esteem: Over time, partici-
pants came to derive greater feelings of self-esteem from 
those of their identity aspects that they had associated at T1 
with each of these four hypothesized bases of self-esteem. 
This model accounted for an estimated 6.77% of the residual 
within-person variance in T2 self-esteem after accounting 
for the effect of T1 self-esteem (i.e., residual change).
We then added cross-level interaction effects to see 
whether the regression weights of self-esteem on each of the 
four bases were significantly moderated by personal and/or 
normative values (Model 4). Compared with Model 3, this 
model provided a significant improvement in fit, χ2(20) = 
267.98, p < .001. Again, cross-level interaction effects 
largely supported our culture-level predictions: Controlling 
one’s life was a stronger prospective predictor of self-esteem 
Figure 4. Controlling one’s life, doing one’s duty, benefitting others, and achieving social status as predictors of self-esteem at Time 1, 
depending on normative openness (vs. conservation) values (Panel A) and normative self-transcendence (vs. self-enhancement) values 
(Panel B) in participants’ cultural environment.
Figure 5. Controlling one’s life, doing one’s duty, benefitting others, and achieving social status as predictors of self-esteem at Time 1, 
depending on personal endorsement of values: Personal openness versus conservation values (Panel A) and personal self-transcendence 
versus self-enhancement values (Panel B).
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Table 3. Estimated Parameters of Multilevel Regression Predicting Self-Esteem Ratings at Time 2.
Model 3 Model 4
 B SE p B SE p
Within-participants main effects (Level 1: n = 29,061 identity aspects)
 Self-esteem (Time 1) .381 .038 <.001 .379 .037 <.001
 Controlling one’s life (Hypothesis 1a) .097 .006 <.001 .091 .006 <.001
 Doing one’s duty (Hypothesis 2a) .043 .005 <.001 .044 .005 <.001
 Benefitting others (Hypothesis 3a) .100 .005 <.001 .099 .005 <.001
 Achieving social status (Hypothesis 4a) .095 .006 <.001 .095 .006 <.001
Individual-level main effects (Level 2: n = 3,178 individuals)
 Personal openness (vs. conservation) .053 .024 .029
 Personal self-transcendence (vs. self-enhancement) .059 .023 .012
Culture-level main effects (Level 3: n = 17 cultural groups)
 Normative openness (vs. conservation) −.611 .259 .033
 Normative self-transcendence (vs. self-enhancement) −.220 .331 .517
Individual-level moderators of within-participants slopes
 Personal openness (vs. conservation) × Controlling one’s life 
(Hypothesis 1b)
.001 .004 .773
 Personal openness (vs. conservation) × Doing one’s duty 
(Hypothesis 2b)
−.004 .004 .317
 Personal openness (vs. conservation) × Benefitting others −.003 .004 .479
 Personal openness (vs. conservation) × Achieving social 
status
.003 .005 .559
 Personal self-transcendence (vs. self-enhancement) × 
Controlling one’s life
.008 .004 .052
 Personal self-transcendence (vs. self-enhancement) × Doing 
one’s duty
.001 .004 .868
 Personal self-transcendence (vs. self-enhancement) × 
Benefitting others (Hypothesis 3b)
.002 .004 .544
 Personal self-transcendence (vs. self-enhancement) × 
Achieving social status (Hypothesis 4b)
.001 .005 .908
Culture-level moderators of within-participants slopes
 Normative openness (vs. conservation) × Controlling one’s 
life (Hypothesis 1c)
.062 .015 <.001
 Normative openness (vs. conservation) × Doing one’s duty 
(Hypothesis 2c)
−.036 .014 .013
 Normative openness (vs. conservation) × Benefitting others −.039 .015 .009
 Normative openness (vs. conservation) × Achieving social 
status
.007 .016 .672
 Normative self-transcendence (vs. self-enhancement) × 
Controlling one’s life
.010 .019 .599
 Normative self-transcendence (vs. self-enhancement) × 
Doing one’s duty
.036 .018 .040
 Normative self-transcendence (vs. self-enhancement) × 
Benefitting others (Hypothesis 3c)
.064 .018 .001
 Normative self-transcendence (vs. self-enhancement) × 
Achieving social status (Hypothesis 4c)
.006 .019 .748
Residual variance
 Within-participant level (σ2) 2.54 2.53  
 Individual-level intercept variance (τ
π0
) 2.29 <.001 2.28 <.001
 Individual-level slope variance for T1 self-esteem (τ
π1
) .09 < .001 .09 < .001
 Culture level (τ
β0
) .28 <.001 .18 <.001
 Culture-level slope variance for T1 self-esteem (τ
β1
) .02 < .001 .02 < .001
Deviance 119,505 119,413
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in cultures where people on average endorsed more openness 
(H1c: B = .06, p < .001), whereas doing one’s duty was a 
stronger predictor in cultures where people endorsed more 
conservation values (H2c: B = −.04, p = .01), as well as more 
self-transcendence values (B = .04, p = .040). Benefitting 
others was more important in cultures where people on aver-
age endorsed more self-transcendence (H3c: B = .06, p = 
.001), and also where people endorsed more conservation 
values (B = −.04, p = .009). We did not find the expected 
moderation of the importance of achieving social status by 
normative self-transcendence (vs. self-enhancement) values 
(H4c: B = .01, p = .748).
Simple slopes were used to probe the significant interac-
tions between normative values and bases of self-esteem, 
estimating effects at minimum and maximum observed nor-
mative values. As shown in Figure 6, the effect of controlling 
one’s life was almost 3 times as strong in cultures with the 
most open values (B = .12, p < .001), compared with cultures 
where conservation values were most prevalent (B = .04, p = 
.001). The effect of doing one’s duty showed the opposite 
pattern; it was twice as strong where conservation values 
were most prevalent (B = .07, p < .001) than in cultures with 
the most open values (B = .03, p = .001), and it was also 
twice as strong in the most self-transcendent cultures (B = 
.06, p < .001), than in the most self-enhancing cultures (B = 
.03, p = .001). Finally, the effect of benefitting others was 
somewhat stronger in cultures with the most self-transcen-
dent values (B = .13, p < .001), compared with cultures with 
the most self-enhancing values (B = .08, p < .001), and also 
somewhat stronger where conservation values were most 
prevalent (B = .13, p < .001), than in cultures with the most 
open values (B = .08, p < .001).
No significant individual-level moderations were found. 
Thus, the longitudinal analysis clearly supported H1c to H3c 
(but not H4c)—where we had posited effects of living in a 
cultural environment with particular normative value priori-
ties—whereas they did not support H1b to H4b—where we 
had posited effects of holding particular personal value 
priorities.6
Discussion
Supporting a culture-based view of self-esteem, cultural val-
ues moderated how positive self-regard was constructed. 
Bases for self-evaluation varied predictably with normative 
value priorities (but less so with personal values, as we dis-
cuss below). As hypothesized, self-esteem was derived more 
from controlling one’s life in cultural contexts where open-
ness values were more prevalent, more from doing one’s 
duty where conservation values were more prevalent, more 
from benefitting others where self-transcendence values 
were more prevalent, and more from achieving social status 
where self-enhancement values were more prevalent. With 
one exception, these results were found in longitudinal as 
well as cross-sectional analyses. The extent to which each 
aspect of identity satisfied culturally relevant bases of self-
esteem at T1 prospectively predicted how those aspects of 
identity were evaluated at T2. This finding confirms our 
view of these constructs as antecedents of self-esteem that 
vary in strength across cultures.7
Our prediction that the effect of achieving social status 
would be stronger in cultures valuing self-enhancement 
(H4c) was supported only cross-sectionally. Speculatively, 
this might be attributed to the more stable social structures in 
Figure 6. Controlling one’s life, doing one’s duty, achieving social status, and benefitting others as predictors of self-esteem at Time 2, 
depending on normative openness versus conservation values (Panel A) and normative self-transcendence versus self-enhancement values (Panel 
B) in participants’ cultural environment.
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more self-enhancing (i.e., more hierarchical) societies. 
Where social status is fixed, perhaps its effects on self-eval-
uation are established at an earlier age, and there would be 
less scope for judgments of social status to influence self-
esteem during adolescence—thus canceling out the moderat-
ing role of values in our longitudinal analysis.
In addition, we found two unpredicted effects. First, 
doing one’s duty was a stronger basis for self-evaluation in 
cultures where self-transcendence prevails. Although not 
predicted, it makes sense that doing one’s duty would be 
valued not only as a sign of conformity—hence its impor-
tance where conservation values were more prevalent—but 
also as a sign of concern for others, which would make it 
important in more self-transcendent cultures. Second, the 
prospective effect of benefitting others was stronger in cul-
tures where conservation values were more prevalent. We 
speculate that caring for others, particularly family and 
close community members, is a central aspect of many cul-
tural traditions, making benefitting others a more important 
basis for self-evaluation in these more traditional cultures. 
Together, these findings indicate that the moderators of 
doing one’s duty and of benefitting others are less distinct 
than we had expected.
Disentangling Effects of Normative and Personal 
Values
Our predicted pattern of moderation effects was supported 
mainly at the cultural level of analysis. Corresponding mod-
eration effects of personal values showed a weaker and 
inconsistent pattern in cross-sectional analyses, and none 
reached significance in longitudinal analyses. TMT and the 
SCENT model suggest that culture affects self-esteem 
through internalization or personal adoption of cultural val-
ues, but we found that the normative values of each cultural 
group significantly predicted how self-esteem was con-
structed by the group members, irrespective of the individu-
als’ personal values. These differences in the bases for 
self-evaluation cannot be attributed to individuals’ personal 
adoption of cultural values—instead, they appeared to be 
effects of living in a particular cultural context where certain 
values are prevalent.
Previous researchers have speculated that personal values 
may play a greater role in moderating the importance of 
bases of self-esteem that are not consensually valued (but see 
Scalas, Morin, Marsh, & Nagengast, in press). Perhaps this 
might explain our cross-sectional finding that social status 
was a stronger basis for self-esteem among individuals with 
more self-enhancing personal values (H4b)—considering 
that the pursuit of social status may not be a consensually 
valued or likeable characteristic (Easterbrook, Dittmar, 
Wright, & Banerjee, 2013). Nonetheless, we reiterate that 
this effect should be interpreted with caution because it was 
relatively small and it was not found in our longitudinal 
analysis.
Although previous single-culture studies have provided 
suggestive evidence that normative rather than personal val-
ues may drive the contributions of different domains to 
global self-esteem (see Marsh, 2008), no previous study has 
provided firm evidence for the role of normative values by 
comparing predictions of global self-esteem across multiple 
groups with differing value priorities. Thus, our results 
strengthen arguments against the common view (often attrib-
uted to James, 1890) that individuals’ self-evaluations are 
largely guided by their personal values. Perhaps the intuitive 
appeal of this view stems from its compatibility with Western, 
individualistic cultural assumptions. However, our results 
indicate a need to reconceptualize self-evaluation as a truly 
social-psychological process, influenced by socially norma-
tive rather than personal value priorities.
Possible Underlying Processes
Our multilevel analyses confirm the need for a contextual 
level of explanation, raising interesting questions about the 
underlying processes. How might normative value priorities 
come to influence self-evaluation?
According to sociometer theory (Leary, 2005), self-
esteem is based on people’s beliefs about what makes others 
accept (or reject) them—or perceived relational value. Thus, 
intersubjective perceptions of the value priorities of peers, 
family, and others from whom the individual seeks accep-
tance, will be the more proximal mechanism by which cul-
turally normative value priorities come to influence 
self-evaluation. Similarly, the intersubjective culture per-
spective (Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg, & Wan, 
2010) focuses on individuals’ perceptions of normative val-
ues in their cultural context. According to this perspective, 
perceived cultural norms have an important psychological 
impact over and above individuals’ personal values, because 
consensual ideas are interpreted as correct and natural, 
because social identification with one’s cultural group will 
lead individuals to embrace the group’s norms, and because 
of social accountability to others. Thus, the influence of cul-
ture on the self-evaluation process could be carried by indi-
viduals’ perceptions of widespread cultural values, as well as 
the local norms emphasized in sociometer theory.
However, explicit awareness of others’ value priorities 
may not be necessary. We did not measure participants’ per-
ceptions of others’ values, but such perceptions often do not 
correspond with actual variation in others’ values (Chiu et 
al., 2010; Fischer, 2006)—which provided the moderation 
effects in the current study. Moreover, Tam et al. (2012) 
recently used perceptions of cultural trait importance to pre-
dict self-enhancement among Chinese and American par-
ticipants. American participants’ self-enhancement was 
unrelated to perceived cultural importance of the traits; 
Chinese participants self-enhanced more on traits that they 
perceived as less important to fellow cultural members. 
These findings suggest that perceptions of others’ values are 
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unlikely to account for the effects of normative values 
observed here.
If intersubjective perceptions cannot explain our findings, 
then automatic processes might (Cohen, 1997; Hofer & 
Bond, 2008). Leary (2005) predicted that the sociometer 
may be at least partly automatic: People automatically detect 
threats to relational value (e.g., frowns) in the environment, 
and they may only subsequently reflect consciously upon the 
situation. If relational value is detected at an implicit level, 
then the value priorities of others in one’s local environment 
might convey the effects of culture on identity construction, 
without needing to be recognized explicitly by the individual 
concerned.
Conceptions of culture from anthropology, cultural psy-
chology, and social constructionism often emphasize that 
which is “taken-for-granted” in a given community, rather 
than individuals’ explicit, declarative beliefs and values, and 
view cultures as emergent properties of social systems, rather 
than targets of individual perceptions (see Faulkner, Baldwin, 
Lindsley, & Hecht, 2006; Gergen, 1985; Kitayama, Park, 
Sevincer, Karasawa, & Uskul, 2009). The niche construction 
approach to culture (Yamagishi, 2010) suggests we could 
understand the bases of self-esteem observed here as aspects 
of social institutions or niches—self-sustaining systems of 
shared beliefs, incentives, and social practices. For example, 
in social systems where people’s values are focused on self-
transcendence, an individual’s everyday life and the incen-
tives surrounding their actions will be strongly organized 
around the extent to which they benefit others—whether 
they are aware of this or not—and thus individuals may 
develop a tendency to derive self-esteem particularly from 
aspects of their identities that benefit others.
Notably, our approach to measuring bases of self-esteem 
did not require explicit awareness of the processes we were 
examining (see Cai et al., 2011). Instead of asking partici-
pants to report directly on what sort of characteristics they 
believed would make them feel more or less positive about 
themselves, we studied the self-evaluation process using an 
indirect technique. As our analyses were based on complex 
patterns of multivariate within-person associations among 
measures embedded in much larger questionnaires, and mea-
sures for our longitudinal analyses were collected several 
months apart, it seems unlikely that participants would have 
been aware of the statistical patterns underlying our findings 
(Becker et al., 2012). Thus, our method would be attuned to 
detecting bases of self-esteem that were implicit or taken-
for-granted by our participants, not just the dimensions on 
which they consciously decided to evaluate themselves.
Limitations and Future Directions
Our participants were mostly high school students, and the 
results may not generalize to other groups. Although high 
school students are potentially more diverse in terms of socio-
economic status and ethnic diversity than university students, 
they are still a selective group, especially in poorer nations. 
One might also expect sources of self-esteem to change over 
the life span (Erikson, 1980), and thus we should be cautious 
about generalizing the present results to other age groups.
In the present research, we tested two broad value dimen-
sions as cultural and individual moderators of bases of self-
esteem. However, it could be that personal rather than normative 
values play a stronger role when more specific dimensions are 
examined. Investigating this would require the use of more 
fine-grained value measures (e.g., Schwartz et al., 2012).
Future research should measure intersubjective percep-
tions of cultural values, in addition to participants’ own val-
ues, to establish whether the contextual moderation effects 
that we observed here are mediated by individuals’ explicit 
beliefs about cultural norms, as suggested by the intersubjec-
tive culture approach, or by more subtle processes, as we 
have proposed above. By sampling participants from multi-
ple locations within each nation, researchers could also com-
pare the importance of actual and perceived contextual 
norms at local and wider cultural levels.
Conclusion
We have presented the first study to test systematically 
whether the construction of self-esteem is moderated by cul-
tural and individual differences in value priorities, using 
Schwartz’s (1992) model to provide an adequate character-
ization of value priorities, and recruiting participants from a 
larger and more diverse range of cultural groups than previ-
ous studies. Our multilevel analyses showed that bases for 
self-evaluation are defined collectively, reflecting culturally 
normative values, rather than personally endorsed values. 
Within any given cultural context, individuals evaluate them-
selves in culturally appropriate ways, deriving feelings of 
self-esteem particularly from those identity aspects that fulfill 
values prioritized by others in their cultural surroundings.
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Notes
1. We do not aim here to resolve the long-running disagreement 
between Heine (2005) and Sedikides, Gaertner, and Toguchi 
(2003) about the cross-cultural prevalence of particular self-
enhancement mechanisms. Instead, we focus on an important, 
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but often neglected, area of common ground between their per-
spectives (see Smith, Fischer, Vignoles, & Bond, 2013).
2. Schwartz (1992, 2009) recommended partitioning and label-
ing the individual- and culture-level values spaces differently. 
Nonetheless, one implication of the circumplex structure at each 
level is that researchers may legitimately partition these circles 
according to their research goals (Schwartz et al., 2012). Here, 
as we do not assume that our samples were comparably repre-
sentative of each national context, we operationalized normative 
values by averaging personal value priorities within each cul-
tural group, rather than creating separate culture-level measures. 
In relation to Schwartz’s (2009) culture-level dimensions, we 
expected that normative openness versus conservation values 
would be linked to cultural autonomy versus embeddedness; 
normative self-transcendence versus self-enhancement might 
reflect a combination of cultural harmony versus mastery and 
egalitarianism versus hierarchy.
3. The Brazilian samples were collapsed into a single group for 
these analyses.
4. Further analysis revealed that this effect was only significant 
when controlling for the opposing culture-level moderation, 
whereas the predicted culture-level moderation effect was found 
irrespective of whether we controlled for the individual-level 
effect. Moreover, the individual-level moderation did not reap-
pear in longitudinal analyses.
5. The same pattern was found when controlling for gross national 
income (GNI; in hundreds of dollars) and gender (dummy 
coded: female = −1, male = 1). This model showed additionally 
that controlling one’s life was more important in richer nations 
(B = .01, p = .027), whereas doing one’s duty was more impor-
tant in poorer nations (B = −.02, p < .001); benefitting others 
(B = −.03, p < .001) and achieving social status (B = −.02, p = 
.003) were more important among women, and doing one’s duty 
among men (B = .01, p = .013).
6. The same pattern was found when controlling for GNI and 
gender. We found no significant moderation effects of GNI, 
but effects were moderated by gender: Benefitting others (B = 
−.03, p < .001), controlling one’s life (B = −.01, p = .03), and 
doing one’s duty (B = −.01, p = .03) were more important among 
women than among men.
7. Results of the longitudinal analyses strengthen the case for 
causal paths from the four bases to self-esteem but do not 
weaken the case for possible additional links among these vari-
ables. Possibly participants also came to interpret those identity 
aspects they associated with the most self-esteem as providing 
a sense of controlling one’s life, benefitting others, achieving 
social status, and fulfillment of duties. We did not test here for 
“reverse-direction” effects, but their existence would not under-
mine our central argument.
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